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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the international community debates the elaboration of the International 
Development Agenda post-2015 and the Sustainable Development Goals, the future of 
development of cooperation is at stake. These debates mark shifts in consensus thinking about 
development as an international project, how the important objectives are defined, what key 
constraints are identified, and what strategies are considered as necessary to overcome 
constraints and achieve objectives. The Millennium Declaration and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) marked a departure in how development is defined by achieving a 
consensus on poverty as its primary, over-arching objective. This is an important achievement 
in advancing global commitment to human dignity. But as Charles Gore (2010) remarks, this 
new idea about development replaces an old idea about development. He warned that this 
could be a ‘Faustian Bargain’ where developing countries give up the idea of development as 
transforming the productive capacity of their national economies.  
Thus the MDGs mark a major departure from the idea of development as economic 
transformation that underpinned the post-war framework for international cooperation as 
support to developing countries to become economically self-sustaining, and around which 
arrangements for resource transfers and other types of support were developed, including 
specific arrangements for development aid, trade agreements, debt relief, and capacity building. 
The focus on poverty is not only new but reframes the architecture of these global economic 
arrangements. Such shifts in thinking can have fundamental implications for economic and 
political relations between the rich and poor countries of the world.  
This paper explores the implications of these shifts in thinking. It first examines how 
consensus ideas about development—the MDGs in this case—can exert influence on national 
and international policy priorities and identifies two mechanisms, through setting standards for 
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performance and resource allocation, and through creating a narrative. The paper then contrasts 
the MDG consensus framing of development with earlier conceptions of development in the 
way that it articulates a motivation as a political priority, identifies key problems, objectives, 
and unit of analysis. Finally, the paper then examines how priorities of national governments 
and donors have shifted since 2000.  
2. HOW GLOBAL GOALS SHAPE IDEAS AND EXERT INFLUENCE ON 
DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES  
What consequences do global goals have on policies and action? The influences are 
indirect, for the agenda is not an implementation plan comprised of policy reforms and 
investment projects, and those who elaborated the MDGs do not have control over resources 
and policies. But as the recent work on the sociology of numbers show (Merry, 2009), indicators 
can exert influence in two ways: first, by influencing resource allocation by being used as 
planning targets or indirectly by setting standards for performance or introducing planning 
targets; and secondly by communicating a narrative of development and a framework for 
action.  
The MDGs have come to be effectively used in these two ways. First, they have become 
the standard reference framework for international development. They are used as a proxy to 
judge progress in tackling global poverty. The UN, the World Bank and numerous other 
international bodies monitor MDG implementation and issue annual reports with detailed data. 
IMF country reports systematically include data on MDG progress, along with key 
macroeconomic performance indicators. UN meetings to review progress in achieving MDGs 
have become both frequent and high-profile political events that are significant for a country’s 
prestige and international standing. MDGs have come to be used by some governments and 
donors as planning targets that shape priority spending and effort. National development 
frameworks, notably the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers prepared by low-income countries 
as a requirement for benefitting from debt relief, have adopted the MDGs. Moreover, the 
monitoring of government performance is predicated on the assumption that the goals are hard 
planning targets for which government must be held accountable1.  
Second, the MDGs have been most frequently used for communicating global poverty as 
an urgent challenge and a priority for global action. But in the process, they have also come to 
redefine development. Political leaders make speeches defending policy initiatives with the 
warning: ‘without such and such action the MDGs will not be achieved’. Economists write 
research papers on macroeconomic policy choices and evaluate them against contributions to 
achieving MDGs. Local NGOs advocate national budget reforms ‘to achieve the MDGs’, 
                                                             
1 However, as I have explained in another article (Fukuda-Parr, Greenstein, & Stewart, 2013), this makes little sense as 
the methodology of national planning requires consideration of many factors other than globally agreed-upon social 
objectives. 
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however critical they may be of these goals, because they are the accepted standard to evaluate 
policy. Media reports on poverty refer to failure to achieve MDGs as a demonstration of 
pervasive abject poverty. In other words, MDGs have become a convenient short hand for what 
they mean by the purpose of development and ending poverty.  
This redefinition of development is not based on a theoretical reformulation of the 
concept. Yet it presents a narrative that can reframe development policy agendas.  
3. LOCATING THE MDGS  IN THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT 
THINKING AND PARADIGMS  
The MDG narrative—referred to in this paper as ‘Development as Ending Poverty’—
contrasts with earlier conceptualizations of development in the way that the key objectives are 
defined. It also contrasts in its analytical framing in terms of the way that the problem is 
defined, and the unit of analysis, the priority concern with inequality and poverty within or 
between countries, and whether development is understood as a set of outcomes or as a 
process. While there have been multiple and competing conceptions of development that have 
been advanced, for the purposes of this paper, they can be grouped into three strands of 
thought that have dominated development thinking: ‘development as transforming national 
productive capacity’; ‘development as globalization’; and ‘development as improving human 
well-being’.  
3.1. CORE ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AS ENDING POVERTY  
The MDGs are not a theory of development but a list of targets. Moreover, the MDGs 
were developed as reporting tools to monitor the implementation of the Millennium 
Declaration’s commitments, in which world leaders pledged to do their utmost to lift their 
fellow men, women and children from the dehumanizing conditions of poverty. Yet they have 
come to be used as a consensus framework creating a narrative of development. The MDGs 
identify ending absolute poverty as the core purpose. As explained by the UN (United Nations, 
2008), while each of the eight goals is important, they are intended to be seen as a package. ‚The 
goals and targets are interrelated and should be seen as a whole. They represent a partnership 
between the developed countries and the developing countries to create an environment—at the 
national and global levels alike—which is conducive to development and the elimination of 
poverty" (United Nations, 2008 p.2). 
Thus the MDG framing of development is motivated by concern with absolute poverty 
as an urgent social priority, and international action appeals to humanitarianism. The goals 
focus on human outcomes, and the disregard for the means was an important strength in 
achieving consensus (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme). In fact, the MDGs grew out of the context of the 
1990s when the development community was divided in bitter controversies over structural 
adjustment lending programs and neoliberal policies. The success of the MDGs was to be able 
to form a consensus on points of agreement—improving human outcomes—without raising the 
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divisive issues of policy strategies (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme). The analytical framework of this 
narrative identifies the problem as the existence of pervasive absolute poverty in the world, 
with the unit of analysis focused on the individual, and the situation within the context of 
inequality within countries. However the specificity of country conditions is ignored, as goals 
do not take account of initial conditions but set the same time-bound targets for all countries.  
3.2. DEVELOPMENT AS TRANSFORMING PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY  
The concept of development that dominated the field for much of the 20th century can 
be characterized as ‘transforming productive capacity of national economies’ (Gore, 2010). 
Development as an international project emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
when the world community adopted it as one of its key objectives along with peace and 
security. It emerged in the context of the decolonization process, motivated by the need for 
newly independent countries to be economically, not just politically, viable. The motivation 
focuses on inequality between countries rather than within. In contrast to the MDG narrative, 
the analytical framework identifies the problem as the weak capacity of newly independent and 
other non-industrialized countries. The unit of analysis is the country in the context of an 
unequal world.  
Informed by modernization theories2 and economic growth models3, the policy strategy 
over the 1950s up to early 1980s focused on industrialization and diversification including 
technological transformation, and built on investment in physical and, later, human capital. In 
the absence of a significant private sector, public sector investments were considered necessary, 
requiring capital transfers from rich to poor countries. The purpose of development aid was 
therefore to provide concessional financing. While mainstream policy strategies focused on 
national investments, heterodox economists including Structuralists and Dependency theorists 
identified the workings of the international economic system as key constraints and advocated 
policy reforms and arrangements in areas of trade, investment, access to capital and commodity 
markets that would create a more enabling condition for development. Both mainstream and 
heterodox economists understood development as a long-term process. The main point of 
concern was as much about the process of transformation in economic and social structures 
necessary for sustained improvement in living standards as the higher levels of living standards 
achieved.  
Though there sharp divides between the North and the South on the agenda of the 
South, much of it was reflected in the UN consensus development agendas (Stokke, 2009).4 The 
                                                             
2 Such as Rostow’s model of takeoff. 
3 Such as Harrod-Domar model, the Solow model, and the New Growth Theories. 
4 For a well-researched history of the four development decades, see Un Intellectual History Project series, notably 
Olav Stokke, 2009. 
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First UN Development Decade set a goal of 5 percent annual growth and emphasized the need 
for financing development. Industrialized countries were urged to cooperate by helping ensure 
high commodity prices, providing markets for developing country exports, and providing a 
target of 1 percent of GDP in concessional finance. The Second UN Development Decade (1970s) 
set an agenda to promote sustained economic growth with a goal of at least 6 percent per 
annum. The strategy emphasized the important role of the developed countries in helping 
transfer capital that was beyond the capacity of the countries themselves and maintained the 
target of 1 percent of GDP to be transferred in the form of development aid. National 
governments prepared five-year development plans the core of which was long-term 
investment projects. External donors supported these plans by financing these projects.  
3.3. DEVELOPMENT AS GLOBALIZATION  
The onset of globalization starting in the 1980s not only involved shifts in national 
policies but had major implications for reconceptualizing economic and political relations 
between the North and the South. The idea of global market integration is underpinned by the 
principle that all countries compete equally in global markets, an idea that contradicts the 
principle behind the development project that starts from the recognition of differentiated levels 
of development, or inequality between countries. In contrast, the basic problem identified in the 
premise of the earlier development project was the unequal levels of development amongst 
countries.  
The key problem of developing countries is identified as the weak ability to benefit from 
global markets—trade and private investments—that would be the engine of economic growth. 
Poverty reduction is assumed to be a consequence of growth and global integration. Policy 
agendas from the 1980s pursued liberalization, with the core policies described as ‘Washington 
Consensus’. While the application of the core macroeconomic policies—fiscal discipline, 
monetary policy, trade openness, privatization and deregulations—can vary and has become 
more flexible and adapted to national conditions, the basic principle of maintaining stability as 
a central objective remains.  
The focus on growth contrasts with the MDG focus on poverty and the individual, yet 
the two paradigms are perfectly complementary in the way that the earlier framing is not. The 
MDG narrative neatly skirts around the issue of unequal initial conditions, and of defining 
development by outcome rather than by a process of transformation.  
3.4. DEVELOPMENT AS IMPROVING HUMAN WELL-BEING  
Through the decades, critics challenged mainstream strategies for neglecting attention to 
what should be the ethical motivation for development, namely to improve human lives. 
Alternative approaches that incorporated well-being into conceptualizing development and in 
formulating policy strategies came into prominence from the 1970’s, as international agencies 
began to launch initiatives such as the ILO’s employment program and the World Bank’s 
Working paper prepared for JICA/IPD Africa Task Force Meeting 
Yokohama, Japan, June 2-3, 2013 
6 
poverty initiatives under President McNamara. The introduction of Basic Needs in the late 
1970s was a major step in bringing human well-being into conceptualizing development.  
The 1980s and 1990s were also decades with important evolution in conceptualizing 
human well-being as central development objectives. While Basic Needs focused on key 
outcomes and on social investments as a policy strategy, other approaches emerged which 
emphasized human agency and development as societal change. The work of Amartya Sen 
(Sen, 1999) on capabilities was a major advance and provided a rich conceptual framework for 
reconceptualizing development as expansion of human capabilities, or the freedom that people 
can have to do and be what they would value. Other approaches, including feminism, human 
rights, and participation also emerged following distinctive theoretical frameworks. These 
perspectives that emerged in the 1990s were complementary, especially in forging the mutually 
supportive policy agendas critical of globalization that were influential in shaping the debates 
and agendas adopted at the UN Conferences of the 1990s. Each focuses on distinct concerns but 
shares common elements as development frameworks. They describe the central problem or 
objective as improvement in human well-being—defined in diverse ways—but challenge the 
notion of economic growth as a central objective by pointing out that the negative consequences 
of growth on people. But in addition, they emphasize three other elements—equality, 
participation and transformation—that were not part of earlier conceptions of development as 
well-being, including Basic Needs. First, they are motivated by a common commitment to 
equality of individuals. Second, they emphasize participation as an important element of a 
development strategy, seeing people as agents of change, not just as beneficiaries. For this 
reason, empowerment of people and groups is an essential means to progress, and power 
structures are an important obstacle. Just as the earlier conception saw development as a 
transformation of productive capacities, these approaches understand development to be 
transformative of social and political arrangements.  
While at first glance, capabilities and rights approaches would appear similar to the 
MDG narrative, the overlap is very limited. The unit of analysis is the individual, but is broader. 
Capabilities and rights approaches include groups and inequality between countries as inter-
group discrimination, and therefore incorporate attention on groups within countries, and focus 
on disaggregated analysis. Concerned with what people are able to do and not just outcomes or 
possession of material resources, development is understood as a process of social and political 
transformation. Feminist approaches exemplify this way of conceptualizing development; while 
feminist economics opened up the definition of the economy as market activity to incorporate 
all activities that lead to provisioning of human needs (Power, 2004), policy frameworks go far 
beyond advocating for equal education and health to women having a voice in decision making 
in all spheres of life.  
Human well-being began to be reflected in consensus agendas. The UN’s International 
Strategy for the Third Development Decade, adopted in 1981, also included objectives to reduce 
poverty and inequality, and the human dimensions of development—hunger, childhood 
survival, health, water and sanitation—were prominent among objectives (Stokke, 2009). For 
the first time, this UN Development Decade set goals for primary education (universal primary 
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education by 2000), infant survival (120 deaths per 1000 live births in the poorest countries), and 
employment (full employment by 2000). These themes continued into the Fourth Development 
Decade of the 1990s. But it was in the 1990s that the development as capability expansion and 
human rights fulfillment became dominant on UN conference agendas. These agendas were 
agreed in the context of the controversies over the social impact of structural agenda and the 
economic liberalization reforms that were being implemented in the 1980s and 1990s 
throughout the world. An important motivation was to pursue inclusive globalization and that 
the benefits of globalization were shared broadly by all countries and people within countries 
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development, 2007). The conference 
agendas reflected the broad human development approach, emphasizing: recognition of human 
rights from the right to food to women’s rights; inequality within and between countries; 
participation; and inter-connections amongst different dimensions of development.  
 
Table 1: Development Paradigms Compared 
 
 Development as 
transforming 
productive 
capacities of 
countries  
Development as 
globalization 
Development as 
improving human 
well-being 
Development as 
ending poverty 
Problem 
described as 
Weak capacity in 
the economy 
Weak ability to 
benefit from global 
markets 
Constrained 
human lives 
conditioned by 
diverse national 
and global 
processes 
Extensive absolute 
poverty in the 
world 
Unit of analysis National aggregate National aggregate Individuals, 
groups, national 
aggregates 
Individual 
Approach to 
inequality and 
poverty as a 
concern 
Between countries Within countries Within and 
between countries 
Within countries 
Development as 
outcome or 
process 
Outcome and 
process 
Outcome Outcome and 
process 
Outcome 
Key motivation Decolonization 
and catch up 
Free markets, 
global integration 
Humanitarian, 
human dignity 
and freedom 
Humanitarian 
 
Table 1 summarizes the contrasts between the MDG narrative and other concepts of 
development. The MDG narrative reflects important shifts in the conception of development 
and the way that motivations and objectives are defined, problems are identified and policy 
priorities and agendas are framed. The MDG narrative redefines the motivation of international 
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development from an economic and political to a humanitarian project; from weak capacity of 
national economies to individuals living in abject poverty as the inequality issue; and an 
understanding of development as a process to a set of outcomes. Focusing on outcomes rather 
than process, and on individuals rather than countries, excludes issues of unequal economic 
and political relations between countries that development cooperation was originally intended 
to redress.  
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
How did the new definition of development change economic relations between the 
North and the South? Recalling Gore’s Faustian bargain referred to earlier in this paper, has the 
consensus on poverty lead to a neglect of support for national economic development, as Gore 
predicted?  
4.1. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: A BASIC NEEDS AGENDA 
The MDGs influence resource allocation by setting standards and creating a narrative. 
They create incentives to prioritize public investment in meeting basic needs, with little 
attention to building productive capacities, or to transforming social structures. One major gap 
is that the MDGs leave out the economy altogether, even though without economic growth, 
most MDGs cannot be achieved. Employment was only added as an afterthought in 2005 and is 
embedded in the broader poverty goal. Agricultural production is indirectly reflected in the 
hunger target, which in itself is buried in the poverty goal. Indeed, Ha-Joon Chang remarked in 
his recent paper, ‚Laudable these goals and targets may be, their sum total does not amount to 
development in the sense we are talking about, as they pay no serious attention to the 
transformation of productive structure and capabilities‛ (Chang, 2010). 
The priority issues advocated by the developing countries since the 1950s are poorly 
represented in this agenda. The issues of aid, trade, debt, technology transfer that are central to 
the economic prospects for countries to compete and succeed in global markets are included in 
goal 8, under the heading of strengthening global partnerships. These wording of these issues 
was notoriously weak, with no quantitative targets. These issues were nonetheless included by 
the architects of the MDGs, because without them, the developing countries would not have 
endorsed the goals5. Development aid is justified on humanitarian grounds for the sake of 
charity rather than on developmental grounds for the sake of justice. These trends are manifest 
for example in the negotiations on climate change in which developing countries have had little 
success in obtaining concessions based on their greater developmental needs for energy in the 
future and limited contribution to the problem in the past. These ideational shifts thus have 
important implications for the political economy of international development. 
                                                             
5 Interview September 12, 2008, with Michael Doyle, former Assistant Secretary General for Strategic Planning and 
chair of the technical committee who elaborated the MDGs.  
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The Development as Ending Poverty agenda is also deceptive with regard to human 
development. While the MDGs incorporate and thus highlight many human development 
priorities as well as Economic and Social Rights—schooling, health, hunger, gender equality—it 
is also bereft of the transformative process of development as empowering people, challenging 
power structures within and between countries. While inequality within and between countries 
and participation was the hallmark of the agendas adopted at the 1990s UN conference agendas, 
these are elements that are outside of this framework.  
4.2. PRIORITIES IN NATIONAL AND DONOR PROGRAMMES 
National and international development policies continue to give priority to objectives 
of macroeconomic stability and economic growth, justified by the theory that growth is not only 
a necessary but also a sufficient condition for reducing poverty. While national and 
international policies appear to set higher priorities for social sector investments to meet basic 
needs, other important elements of the human development strategy are neglected such as 
equality, pro-poor economic growth, empowerment and democratic governance. A study by the 
author (Fukuda-Parr S. 2010) of 22 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) found that these 
national strategy documents almost all identify poverty reduction as the over-riding goal and 
action plans focus on economic liberalization and social investments. They emphasized 
commitment to the MDGs but were selective in which ones they emphasized among the 
multitude of targets and indicators. Almost all of them included among core objective and 
action plans, specific strategies in areas of primary education, health and economic governance. 
For these areas except governance, the strategies set quantitative targets in line with the MDGs. 
What is striking is the absence of the strategic elements of a socially transformative agenda—
empowerment, distribution, employment generating growth, and democratic governance. Of 
the 60 MDG indicators, those that received virtually no mention were those most important for 
ensuring that growth is inclusive and pro-poor, and that development empowers those who are 
marginalized; less than 4 out of 22 documents mentioned employment, natural resource 
conservation, protecting orphans from the HIV/AIDS pandemic, women’s political 
representation, violence against women, and social integration of migrants. And while the 
objective of PRSPs are to generate growth and reduce poverty, there is little by way of proactive 
government support for these objectives such as infrastructure development, expansion of 
credit financing or technological upgrading. The growth is expected to come through the 
private sector by creating a stable macroeconomic environment to foster investments.  
With respect to donors, the same study (Fukuda-Parr S. 2010) also analyzed policy 
statements of the 21 largest bilateral donors. As in the PRSPs, these donor policy documents 
emphasized poverty but not empowerment, social integration, equality, and pro-poor growth, 
the themes that are central to human development. There has been a perceptible increase in 
funding for social sectors and within these sectors to primary basic services ODA for other 
MDG priorities, notably food production and agriculture—which are important for reducing 
hunger and malnutrition and for reducing rural poverty—also increased but much less 
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markedly. The proportion of aid allocated by DAC donors to basic social services increased 
from 10.1 percent in 1999 to 21.0 percent in 2009 while the proportion of ODA for building trade 
capacity declined from 38.5 percent in 2001 to 28.9 percent in 2009 (Tables 2-3, figures 1-4). 
There was a corresponding decline in aid allocations to economic infrastructure and services 
from 24 percent to 15 percent, and production sectors from 12 percent to 7 percent and in 
budget support from 8 percent to 5 percent.  
From the late 1990s, global diseases and health in general received high priority 
attention from both official donors and new foundations such as the Gates Foundation. This has 
led to new initiatives and new financing such as the establishment of the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Manning (Manning, 2009) argues that some of this increase 
was encouraged by the institutionalization of MDGs that drew attention to neglected priorities 
in child and maternal health.  
 
Table 2. ODA commitments by DAC donors 1990-2010 (US$millions, constant 2010) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
 Social Infrastructure and Services  19,844  20,231  20,919   34,174   44,333  
 Production Sectors   10,322  6,755  4,405  5,997  8,977  
 Agriculture   2,142  2,219   3,042   5,372  
      
 General Budget Support  1,155  1,291  561  1,826  2,365  
 Education Total  8,631  7,307  5,522  6,656  9,470  
 Basic Education  .. 775  1,166  1,910  2,510  
 Health Total  2,441  2,845  2,385  4,076  5,116  
 Basic Health  .. 1,266  1,329  2,532   2,945  
      
 Food crop production   83  66  102  239  
Source: UN 2011 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/2011 percent20Stat 
percent20Annex.pdf accessed April 14, 2012. 
Table 3. ODA allocations of DAC donors to MDG priorities (percent of sector allocable ODA) 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 
Basic social services  
(MDG indicator 8.2) 
10.1 14 15.7 15.9 19.9  21 
Aid for trade (MDG 
indicator 8.9)  
 38.5 29 30.7 27.7 34.4 28.9 
Source: UN 2011 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/2011 percent20Stat 
percent20Annex.pdf accessed April 14, 2012. 
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Source, Figures 1-4: OECD.org, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/international-development-statistics.htm 
While the MDGs and the consensus on poverty drew from the UN conference agendas 
for inclusive globalization, the policy content of most PRSPs and donor policy statements 
contain little attention to issues that were at the core of the inclusive globalization agenda of the 
UN conference plans of action. And while it was the criticism of the distributional consequences 
of the Washington Consensus policies and the broader liberalization agendas that drove the 
demise of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s, and the rise of poverty 
and human concerns to the fore of international agendas, maintaining a stable macroeconomic 
environment, economic growth, and liberalization remain key objectives. Stringent 
macroeconomic policies aimed at maintaining low inflation, minimum balance of payments and 
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budgetary deficits still remain at the core of the economic management and development 
strategy, coupled with strengthening institutions of economic governance such as property 
rights. While they are no longer conditions in structural adjustment loans, they are core 
provisions for access to debt relief from the HIPC initiative and from the IMF under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  
Though the Washington Consensus may be ‘dead’, the basic macroeconomic policy 
prescriptions for macroeconomic stability and privatization of economic activity remain at the 
core of both World Bank and IMF lending operations and conditions. Structural adjustment 
loans have been discontinued, but the macroeconomic policy prescriptions continue under IMF 
lending programs and conditions for accessing debt relief. It should be noted that much of the 
criticism of the Washington Consensus was only partly about what the core policy prescription 
that were included (measures to ensure macroeconomic stability) but also about what they left 
out (human well-being, poverty and inequality), the rigidity with which the policy prescriptions 
were applied (ignoring trade-offs involved such as cutting social expenditures), and the aid 
architecture (conditionality) with which they were implemented.  
The post-2000 architecture of international development has changed in terms of 
instruments and narratives but not in content. The structural adjustment loans have been 
replaced by HIPC and IMF PRGF. The policy frameworks on which the funding was based is 
now the national government’s PRSPs with a focus on poverty and has replaced the Policy 
Framework Papers, which required IMF and World Bank approval. These new instruments 
conform to the narrative of the partnership paradigm emphasizing national ownership, but they 
retain the same policy content that condition access to financing. Most importantly, the 
narrative of development and development aid has been reformulated around the moral 
imperative of eliminating dehumanizing poverty, an unacceptable condition for a world of 
immense financial and technological means.  
While the years following the introduction of the MDGs were striking for the ambitious 
and high-profile political commitments made by the G8 countries, such as the pledge to double 
development aid to Africa (or 0.51 percent of their GNIs) made at the Gleneagles Summit in 
2005, they have largely not been implemented (United Nations, 2011) though a few countries 
have made significant increases in their support to Africa.6 Moreover, no significant 
international poverty initiatives were launched, and the rich countries have not shifted their 
positions on critical international economic policies including trade, finance, investment and 
technology transfer. As the title of the UN MDG Gap Task Force 2011 report, ‚The Global 
Partnership for Development: Time to Deliver‛, makes clear, donor countries have fallen far 
short of implementing their Goal 8 targets for aid, trade, debt and technology (United Nations 
MDG Gap Task Force, 2011). So far, the only tangible progress in these areas has been reduction 
of the debt burden of the poorest countries. Multilateral trade talks—the Doha Round, labeled 
                                                             
6The US doubled aid to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2009, one year ahead of the pledge; Canada doubled 
funding from 2001 levels; Norway surpassed the pledge to maintain ODA at 1 percent of GNI, and Switzerland 
increased its ODA to 0.41 percent of GNI. 
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the ‘development round’—have become deadlocked, largely over differences between 
developing and developed country positions on agricultural subsidies in the developed 
countries. Aid commitments have increased in volume, but these trends started before 2000 and 
have slowed since 2006. Moreover ODA still remain at 0.31 percent of donor GNI in 2010, far 
short of the UN target of 0.7 percent GNI. There has been substantial reallocation to the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs)—from $21 billion in 2000 to $29 billion by 2009 (2009 prices and 
exchange rates). But this is still only 0.10 percent of donor GNIs compared with the UN target of 
0.15-0.2 percent GNI (UN 2011 p.10, table 1).  
Surprisingly, the consensus on poverty as a policy priority has not led to fundamental 
debates or new thinking about policy alternatives for faster poverty reduction. While poverty 
reduction was identified as the ‘overarching’ objective, development strategies continued to 
follow the approach of the 1990s that emphasized macroeconomic stabilization as the priority 
objective through the application of Washington Consensus policies to promote aggregate 
economic growth through private investments. Greater focus has been placed on social sector 
investments to meet basic needs and on social protection, including conditional cash transfers.  
For sure, important studies have been published, and there have been many departures 
from the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Social investments and protection, 
including initiatives such as conditional cash transfers, have emerged as important priorities. 
But the core macroeconomic strategies have remained unchallenged. The MDGs did not propel 
new thinking about challenging the macroeconomic policy approaches of the Washington 
Consensus framework, since their implications for poverty reduction have not emerged into 
mainstream international policy debates. In other words, the core Washington Consensus 
policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization have continued to dominate 
development strategies, only supplemented by emphasis on social investments. New 
development strategies and approaches have emerged not from mainstream thinking and 
advice from the international community, but from innovation within developing countries 
such as Brazil and China that have not been in IMF policy-based lending programs. These 
approaches have included not only alternative growth strategies, but also poverty reduction 
strategies, particularly in Brazil and several other Latin American countries which have 
achieved not only stable economic growth and weathered the global financial crisis, but have 
also reduced inequality. These policy approaches have been more interventionist in promoting 
expansionary macroeconomic policies, expanding employment, and raising incomes of the 
poorest, such as through minimum wage legislation.  
4.3. OUTCOMES  
Whether the MDGs have had an impact on the pace of poverty reduction and 
development outcomes is difficult to assess, since it is impossible attribute any recent trends to 
the MDGs as opposed to the myriad of other factors that have driven national poverty 
outcomes. But the problem remains that poverty reduction has continued globally, but too 
slowly and unevenly. Overall, the pace of progress has not accelerated, while the trends have 
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been uneven across regions with Sub-Saharan Africa showing faster progress than other 
regions.  
The UN and other international agencies assess progress made against the 2015 targets, 
focusing on the level of achievement. According to the 2011 UN MDG Progress Report (UN 
2011), globally, the 2015 targets for income poverty (goal 1) and water (goal 7) are on track to be 
met, while steady progress continues in reducing child mortality (goal 4), malaria and other 
global diseases (goal 6). Primary schooling has been advancing, but the pace has begun to slow 
down and the goal of universal enrollment may not be achieved. More alarmingly, there has 
been either stagnation or regress for some goals and targets. The proportion of people who are 
hungry (goal 1) has plateaued at 16 percent since 2000/2002 and the number of undernourished 
people has grown from 817 million in 1990/92 to 830 million in 2005/2007. Employment and 
decent work (goal 1) has shown a setback in many countries, while progress has been slow in 
gender equality and empowerment, other than in primary education (goal 3) and in reducing 
maternal mortality (goal 5).  
The impact of the MDGs on changing policy behavior and outcomes would be reflected, 
if the pace of progress were improved rather than whether the goals were likely to be achieved. 
Countries have different starting points and for many, achieving the MDGs may not be feasible 
even if they were to adopt improved efforts resulting in better performance (Clemens, Kenny, & 
Moss, 2007). In another paper (Fukuda-Parr, Greenstein, & Stewart, 2013) my co-authors and I 
argue that the criterion for success should be improvement in performance, as measured by the 
pace of progress. We proposed a methodology for this criterion and made estimates for 24 
indicators.  
Our findings were disappointing for the country level, but more encouraging for Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia as regions. We found improved performance by a majority of 
countries for just five of the 24 indicators studied. On the other hand, the majority of Sub-
Saharan African countries showed improved progress for 16 indicators. At the global level, the 
pace of progress improved for under-5 mortality rate, measles immunization and gender parity 
in primary schooling, but not for attended births or improved water source. For income 
poverty, the pace improved in all developing regions. Disaggregated to regions, South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions with the highest concentrations of poverty showed 
consistent improvement and performed better than the other regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
progress has been made at a faster progress since the MDGs were introduced across all but one 
indicator for which data are available. In South Asia, improvements are faster for all indicators 
except child mortality and child malnutrition. While it is not possible to attribute the improved 
progress to the MDGs, the record of improvement is encouraging. 
In brief, the impact of MDGs on outcomes and policy is ambiguous, uneven and limited 
at best, but has been a significant factor in shaping international debates. The MDGs did not 
introduce a new concept or policy strategy, but created a narrative that has raised global 
awareness of poverty as a compelling moral challenge requiring urgent action. The narrative 
has become a consensus framework for debate on international development. MDGs are widely 
accepted among the key stakeholders including national governments, donor agencies, NGOs, 
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and local civil society groups, regardless of views that any of these actors might hold 
individually about their relevance as a development strategy. The importance of this new 
awareness and consensus should not be underestimated considering that the pursuit of 
development priorities in the globalized and democratically-governed world requires the public 
at large to share commitments to these priorities as a matter of ethical imperatives of a common 
humanity. The MDGs are associated with an increase in social sector investments, notably in aid 
allocations, but this is continuation of a trend that started prior to the introduction of the MDGs. 
If there is causation, we might ask if donor policy drove the MDGs rather than the other way 
round. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS :  ‘DEVELOPMENT’ IN TRANSITION  
As the international community proceeds to define a new international development 
agenda, what is at stake is as much about a list of priority objectives as what it implies in 
defining the meaning of development. The experience of the MDGs highlights some key issues 
to be considered for the new agenda.  
First, inequality and poverty within countries should not be a priority at the expense of 
inequality between countries. The MDGs have been instrumental in institutionalizing ending 
poverty as a global priority, and equitable and sustainable development as a universal 
challenge. This has been a great advance. At the same time, countries face widely divergent 
conditions and constraints and opportunities. Second, the focus on essential Basic Needs should 
not be at the expense of a broader range of development objectives including economic 
transformation and social change. As a framework for promoting development and ending 
poverty, the MDGs were not instrumental in mobilizing greater support for social investments 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, their major weakness is the extremely narrow scope as a Basic 
Needs agenda, which marginalized productive sectors and the challenge of development as a 
transformative process that builds productive capacity of economies and that empowers people.  
Third, the new agenda should go beyond setting outcome goals to making commitments 
for policy agendas. While the simplicity of quantitative targets on human outcomes has been 
the core strength of the MDGs, does not comprise a strategy. As noted, progress over the last 
decade has been important but uneven and inadequate for the poorest countries. The corollary 
to these trends has been the failure to address the systemic problems of protecting developing 
countries from the consequences of global market integration. A leading example of these 
trends is the inadequate response of international cooperation to protect the poor against the 
consequences of climate change, and the crises of global financial, fuel and food markets. Seen 
in this light, the MDGs could arguably have provided a convenient ‘cover’ behind which the 
economic model of the 1990s—augmented by the Washington Consensus—could be continued 
without controversy. The MDGs perhaps co-opted the language of human development, and 
the inclusive globalization while ‘defanging’ critical debates about the impact of the 
liberalization agendas on poverty and inequality.  
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But the new consensus will require a more effective strategy for equitable and 
sustainable development that is more than a list of goals. Simple, quantitative, and concrete 
goals make effective communications device and targets set benchmarks essential for 
monitoring progress. But that does not make an adequate agenda. 
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